讲座题目：碳市场中基于总量和基于强度的配额机制的福利分析
主 讲 人 ：北京航空航天大学 范英 教授
讲座时间：2022年12月5日（周一）下午15：00
腾讯会议：377-738-212
主讲人简介:
范英教授，北京航空航天大学经济管理学院院长，国家基金委创新研究群体学术带头人，获国家杰出青年科学基金，入选中国科学院“百人计划”和“新世纪百千万人才工程”国家级人选。担任中国能源学会专家委员会副主任、中国系统工程学会能源资源系统工程分会主任委员、中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会低碳发展管理专业委员会理事长等。曾任国际能源经济学会（IAEE）副主席（2016-2020）。
长期从事能源经济和低碳管理的研究工作，研究领域包括能源系统工程、资源与环境经济学、能源金融与碳金融、复杂系统与复杂性等。先后主持国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目、重点项目、重大项目课题、国家重点研发计划项目、重大国际合作项目等国家级科研任务，以及国家各部委、金融机构、大型企业和国际组织等委托项目60余项，在国内外重要学术期刊发表学术论文300余篇，编著15部，2021年被评为科瑞唯安全球高被引学者。
讲座摘要：
Mass- and rate-based schemes are different types of emission trading schemes. Mass-based schemes are usually regarded as first-best market mechanisms for any given level of abatement compared with rate-based schemes. This paper focuses on whether mass-based schemes still achieve higher social welfare in the presence of an imperfectly competitive product market. Considering firms’ heterogeneity in marginal production costs and emission intensities, this paper develops a Cournot duopoly model and theoretically analyzes the relationship of social welfare under mass- and rate-based schemes in interior equilibria with equal total allowances. It is shown that the rate-based scheme leads to larger consumer surplus as a result of the subsidy to output under the scheme. More importantly, the subsidy can reduce the welfare loss caused by market power in the product market. In particular, the rate-based scheme will lead to higher social welfare than the mass-based scheme if the marginal production cost of one firm with a low emission intensity is not greater than that of another firm with a high emission intensity. Additionally, the analytic model is applied to China’s iron and steel industry. The results show that the rate-based scheme achieves higher consumer surplus, producer surplus and social welfare under equal total allowances.
