讲座题目：The Value of Product Recall Insurance in A Decentralized Supply Chain
主讲人：上海财经大学 谢磊 副教授
讲座时间：2021年7月6日 （周二） 上午 10:00
讲座地点：管理楼409教室
主办方：服务科学与服务管理研究中心、运营与供应链研究中心
讲座摘要：
We consider a Stackelberg game wherein a risk-neutral buyer procures components from a risk-neutral supplier. The component's quality is random and the buyer inspects the incoming components to reduce the likelihood of product failure. Neither quality level and inspection effort are contractible. Products assembled by defective components would fail and cause a product recall which leads to external failure costs for the buyer. The buyer provides a procurement contract to induce the supplier's quality improvement and recoup losses by purchasing product recall insurance. The supplier is also allowed to share the buyer’s product recall risk by using product recall insurance with additional insured" status. We find that, product recall insurance decreases inspection effort and enhances contractual incentives which enable the supplier to credibly commit to increase the component quality level. More interestingly, our finding suggests that product recall insurance can serve a coordinating role in collaborating a decentralized supply chain.
主讲人简介:
谢磊博士现任上海财经大学商学院副教授，主要研究方向是：收益管理、库存管理、数据驱动下的运营决策分析、供应链保险和金融。研究成果发表在《管理科学学报》（中文A+），《Manufacturing and Service Operations Management》(UTD24)，《Production and Operations Management》(UTD24)，《European Journal of Operational Research》（ABS 4星），《Naval Research Logistics》（ABS 3星），《Operations Research Letters》等期刊。
